The goal of a kidney exchange program (KEP) is to maximize number of transplants within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP can be modelled as a maximum matching problem in a graph. A KEP between incompatible patient-donor from pools of several hospitals, regions or countries has the potential to increase the number of transplants. These entities aim is to maximize the transplant benefit for their patients, which can lead to strategic behaviours. Recently, this was formulated as a non-cooperative two-player game and the game solutions (equilibria) were characterized when the entities objective function is the number of their patients receiving a kidney. In this paper, we generalize these results for N -players and discuss the impact in the game solutions when transplant information quality is introduced. Furthermore, the game theory model is analyzed through computational experiments on instances generated through the Canada Kidney Paired Donation Program. These experiments highlighting the importance of using the concept of Nash equilibrium, as well as, the anticipation of the necessity to further research for supporting police makers once measures on transplant quality are available.
Introduction
Kidney exchange programs. A patient suffering from chronic kidney disease can see their life quality significantly improved by receiving a transplant of a compatible kidney. Typically, patients are registered in a waiting list and whenever a deceased donor arrives an allocation algorithm is run to determine to which patient in the waiting list the graft will be offered. The allocation algorithms are designed in way that reflects utilitarian and equitable objectives. In addition, a patient can also receive a kidney transplantation from a healthy relative or a friend willing to make the donation.
Unfortunately, the allocation of deceased donors is far from meeting the demand for kidney transplant and living donors may not be able to donate to their loved one due physiologically incompatiblility. Around one in a thousand European citizens suffer from end stage renal disease ref [2012] . In United States and Canada it is the 9th and 11th, respectively, leading cause of death each year ref [a,c] . In particular, in 2017, 78% of the Canadians on the waiting list 2-way exchange 3-way exchange for an organ were waiting for a kidney ref [c] . This disease has a high economic impact on national health services ref [b,c] . Moreover, the number of Canadians living with end-stage kidney disease has grown ref [c] .
In an attempt to tackle the organ shortage, living-donor exchanges have been proposed, that is, patients with an incompatible living-donor can exchange donors. This lead to the kidney exchange programs (KEPs) for which the main goal is to maximize number of transplants within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. Incompatible pairs exchange donors as follows: if the donor in one pair is compatible with the patient of another pair and vice-versa, we have a feasible 2-exchange; this concept can be extended to L-exchanges with L ≥ 2; see Figure 1 . Nowadays, KEPs are run in many countries; e.g., see Biró et al. [2017 Biró et al. [ , 2018 for a recent report on current practices in Europe and Malik and Cole [2014] about the Canadian program. There is an extensive literature formulating the problem with integer programming models and developing techniques to solve it efficiently Abraham et al. [2007] , Constantino et al. [2013] , Dickerson et al. [2016] , Glorie et al. [2014] , Manlove and O'Malley [2012] . As a rule of thumb, the problem is centralized, that is, there is one decision maker deciding the exchanges to be executed; in general the goal is to maximize the number of patients receiving a donation, but other criteria have also been considered.
Multi-agent programs. In U.S., UNOS and NKR are platforms for cross hospital KEPs. An international exchange between Czech Republic and Austria has taken place Böhmig et al. [2017] . In August 2018, another international exchange was performed between a pair from Spain and another from Italy ref [d] . Currently, the hypothesis of an European Program ref [f] is being investigated with already some cross-border programs in place, e.g.. Scandiatransplant Kidney Paired Exchange Program and South Alliance for Transplant. In September 2019, it was announced a joint kidney exchange program between Australia and New Zealand ref [e] . Therefore, there is a recent motivation to study KEPs that can have incompatible pairs belonging to different agents (which can be hospitals, regions or countries) in an attempt to reach a higher social benefit in comparison to the individual case. Under these circumstances, the optimization cannot be anymore simply the maximization of the total number of exchanges: it is expected that each agent behaves strategically with the goal of maximizing the number of its patients receiving a transplant. In fact, the centralized platforms UNOS and NKR do not register a high level of exchanges across hospitals Agarwal et al. [2019] . In this context, the literature has focused in individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms which are centralized kidney exchange programs that guarantee that each agent matches an equal or greater number of its patients and there is incentive for the agents to truthfully reveal all their incompatible patient-donor pairs. In order to achieve these characteristics, it has been proven that the social optimum (maximum number of exchanges when there is full collaboration) might be scarified. Table 1 provides the current landscape of known approximation ratios on the maximum number of grafts (social welfare) for these mechanisms. The values in bold correspond to the mechanisms that are tight, i.e., the mechanisms that match the upper bound. We note that in this context, strategy-proofness implies individual rationality. Note that the social optimum is sacrified in order to get strategy-proofness. However, Blum et al. [2017] can achieve positive results by considering arbitrary graphs and using the fact that vertices are associated with players at random; under some conditions, it is proven that an optimal matching is likely to be individually rational. The authors also provide a simple mechanism which is individually rational and likely to be optimal. The Bayesian approaches model the exchange pool as a random graph that generally is generated based on blood type and tissue type compatibility distributions. In Roth [2011, 2014] , it is shown that in almost all large graphs, individual rationality is close to the social welfare optimum. Parkes [2011, 2015] show a similar result with the difference that a fixed number of hospitals has a very large pool, while in Roth [2011, 2014] there is a growing number of small hospitals.
While the previous papers study the static case, the recent paper of Hajaj et al. [2015] considers a multi-period dynamic model where a credit mechanism is build, proven to be strategy-proof and to lead to a global maximum matching; that approach does not rely on the structure of the compatibility graph, it assumes that each patient-donor pair remains only one period in the pool and a prior knowledge of the average arrival rate of pairs to each hospital.
For the first time, Carvalho et al. [2017] modeled the cross agent KEPs as a non-cooperative game. By giving to the players the power of deciding their internal exchanges, they have incentive to truthfully present their individual
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[2015] Caragiannis et al. [2015] Blum et al. [2017] KEPs. Furthermore, it is proven and argued that the game outcome is a social optimum. These results, focus on the two-player case.
Finally, there have been investigations that do not consider strategical issues (e.g., by assuming that agents agreed on a protocol). Klimentova et al. [2019] focus on fairness questions through a compensation mechanism. analyze the impact of cross-border KEPs when participating countries may have different constraints and objective functions. In another paper, apply a cooperative game theoretical approach, where the goal is to determine an international matching that is as close as possible from the core solution (which in the context of KEPs cannot be used as it is generally illegal to make monetary transactions for transplantations).
Our contribution and paper structure. While in the U.S. the market is fragmented due to hospitals' strategic behavior, in European countries and in Canada, there are single national KEPs where collaboration among hospitals is mandatory. In this context, in Section 2, we recover the positive theoretical results of the non-cooperative KEP in Carvalho et al. [2017] , generalize them for any finite number of players and provide a new interpretation within nationwide programs; we remark that under this game setting each player goal is to maximize the number of her patients receiving a kidney.
Furthermore, in Section 3, we discuss the impact in the game social welfare when a measure of transplant quality is introduced in the game and thus, players' goals move from the cardinality case to a weighted one. Associating weights to transplantations has been considered in the context of KEPs in an attempt to reflect equity (prioritize certain patients); for example, Freedman et al. [2018] develop a framework to learn societal weights. Distinct from the literature, our motivation to introduce weights comes from recent efforts to predict graft quality. Massie et al. [2016] build a risk index for living donor kidney transplantation and more recently, Luck et al. [2017 Luck et al. [ , 2018 use machine learning techniques on the problem of predicting the outcome (graft quality) of a kidney transplant when a pair donor-patient is matched. Such prediction widely enlarges the quantity of information that is present in the system and, of course, helps determining the benefit of each matching, highly distinguishing one from another. Information on transplantations' quality will lead to consider an objective function further away from cardinality (maximizing the number of transplants) and definitely more into a weighted sum (overall time between failures). However, when a measure of graft quality is associated with transplantations, we prove that it becomes computationally hard to even verify an equilibrium. Consequently, it would be expected that the game outcome would not be an equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the addition of information on the quality of a transplant to the multi-agent setting is discussed.
In Section 4, we corroborate our analysis with extensive computational experiments that highlight the importance of considering game theoretical concepts for planning exchanges, as well as its current limitations. Our results allow us to conclude that when players maximize the number of transplants, strategies must be carefully computed in order to guarantee that the game outcome is simultaneously an equilibrium and a social welfare optimum. When players use additional quantitative information, although the negative theoretical results, in practice, equilibria close to be social optimal exist and they can be efficiently computed.
Section 5 concludes this paper, summarizing our contributions and drawing the current open questions.
Background

Preliminares
As the papers on mechanism design, Carvalho et al. [2017] restrict their analysis to games with 2-way exchanges, i.e., L = 2. In the remaining of the paper, we will focus on KEPs with this exchange bound. Mathematically, restricting to L = 2 has the advantage that the problem reduces to matchings on graphs, which is a well understood structure (as it will be revised during the course of this paper) and for such case KEPs can be solved in polynomial time, while for L > 2 the problem becomes NP-hard. In practice, most KEPs prioritize 2-way exchanges (e.g., the Scandiatransplant KEP) as they lead to more robust solutions (in this case, a vertex failure minimizes the damage on the overall solution) and in fact, there are national KEPs that only consider L = 2 (e.g., France and Sweden).
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of players. For each p ∈ N , G p = (V p , E p ) is player p's internal compatibility graph, i.e., the set of vertices V p represents the set of incompatible patient-donor pairs in player p's pool and the set of edges E p represents the pairwise compatibilities within V p . Let E I be the set of external (international) edges, i.e.,
is called a matching of graph G p if no two edges of it share the same node. In this noncooperative game, each player p strategy is a matching M p of G p . The game goes as follows. First, the players simultaneously share their pools G p and E I is determined. Then, independently, each player p selects a matching M p of G p and, simultaneously, players reveal their internal matching to the system which we call independent agent (IA). Finally, IA selects a matching of maximum cardinality M I (M 1 , . . . , M n ) in the remaining international graph
Whenever the context makes it clear, we drop the dependence of the IA matching on the players strategies and simply write M I . Let M I p be the subset of M I which is incident with vertices in V p . In order to ensure that the players can unambiguously compute M I , for − → M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ), we define A( − → M ) has the deterministic algorithm that computes M I ; given a matching M such that M ∩ E I = ∅, then we define − → M = (M ∩ E 1 , . . . , M ∩ E n ), i.e., the matched edges in E I are ignored. For sake of simplicity and whenever the context makes it clear, we use the notation M I to represent the IA decision which implicitly uses algorithm A and depends on the players internal matchings.
The utility function of each player is the number of her patients receiving a kidney, i.e.,
Note that by construction, it seems intuitive that each player p will truthfully reveal the G p since it is player p that controls the internal exchanges that will take place and, by providing true information, the player can evaluate the full potential of the game. For now, let us assume that this holds, and in the next section, we come back to this point and provide formal prove to this intuition.
The goal of a non-cooperative game is to determine the game outcome. The concept of solution used by Carvalho et al. [2017] is that of pure Nash equilibrium (NE). The vector of internal matchings
where the operator (·) −p denotes (·) except player p.
The social welfare value for a game where players play (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n ) is the total number of patients receiving a kidney. A social optimum is a maximum matching of the overall graph game G = (V, E), i.e., a matching in which the social welfare value is maximized. A social welfare equilibrium (SWE) is a NE that is also a social optimum. Carvalho et al. [2017] proved that there is always a SWE for the 2-player game which can be computed in polynomial time, and they briefly discussed the potential extension to the N -player case. We take on from that discussion and we formally prove the following result. Theorem 2.1. For any game with a set of players N and any deterministic algorithm A for the IA, there is a SWE and it can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.
SWE are Pareto efficient and, for the two player case, Carvalho et al. [2017] build an algorithm that, given any NE that is not a social optimum as input, outputs a SWE that dominates it. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that players will focus on SWE; this phenomenon is called the focal-point-effect; see Schelling [1960] .
Market Design: impact on social welfare
The way in which players' interaction is designed in a game significantly impacts the social welfare. Indeed, by looking to Table 1 , it can be concluded that strategy-proof mechanisms cannot guarantee that the social optimum is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 2: Player 1 owns the white circles and player 2 owns the gray diamonds. attained. Although individually rational mechanisms can guarantee a social optimum, note that this does not ensures that players will participate with their full pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs. Let us clarify these statements by recovering an example from Ashlagi et al. [2015] :
Example 2.2. Ashlagi et al. [2015] Consider a two-player kidney exchange game. The graph in Figure 2 represents the overall compatibility graph.
Both players alone can match 2 vertices. This means that an individually rational mechanism must ensure that each player has at least two of her vertices matched. Assume that the clearing house outputs a maximum matching. The graph has two maximum matchings, M = {(2, 3), (4, 5), (6, 7)} and R = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)}, and both have the property of being individually rational. However, none of these two social optimal solutions is strategy-proof: under M , player 1 has incentive to hide and match (5, 6), forcing the mechanism to select {(1, 2), (3, 4), }; under R, player 2 has incentive to hide and match (2, 3), forcing the mechanism to select {(4, 5), (6, 7)}.
On the other hand, the non-cooperative game theory approach overcomes the drawbacks of individually and strategyproof mechanisms: it was proven that there is always a social welfare equilibrium which can be efficiently computed (polynomial time) and, for the 2-player case, the players have incentive to fully reveal their vertices since any solution of the IA benefits equally both players. Clearly, if A is designed such that it outputs a matching of maximum cardinality prioritizing the players with more vertices revealed, then the full participation result extends to the N -player case; see Figure 3 . Furthermore:
Theorem 2.3. The computation of a maximum matching prioritizing the players with more vertices revealed can be done in polynomial time.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In addition to the design of a game with good outcomes from social welfare point of view and from the players' perspective in a cross-boarder KEP, the result of Theorem 2.1 has major consequences in the understanding of KEP. It does not matter how we partition a pool of a KEP into different groups (players): there is always a Nash equilibrium that is also a social optimum. For instance, in a KEP, players can be thought as agents owning incompatible pairs of distinct regions, or distinct incomes, or distinct minorities, etc., and according to Theorem 2.1, independently on how the players' pairs are partitioned among them, there will always exist an equilibrium that is also a social optimum. In a certain sense, such a result provides a theoretical explanation of why regional or national KEPs (e.g., in UK and Netherlands where exchanges of size 2 are prioritized) can be satisfied with the solution of a single decisionmaker optimization problem. Nevertheless, as the computational results of Section 4 will highlight, these maximum matchings must be carefully computed, since the number of maximum matchings can be large and only a very small fraction of them can be Nash equilibria.
Information on transplant's quality: what changes?
Predicting the graft survival of a patient matched with a donor does not depend only on whether they are compatible, but also on their health characteristics (age, life habits, etc.). This means that, for a set of compatible donors, a patient associates a preference according to the predicted graft quality. Thus, when additional information on the quality of transplantations is added to the kidney exchange game, it is expected that the players will weight that information on their utility functions. For instance, a player optimization problem can become a maximization of a weighted matching, instead of the cardinality one.
Let us emphasize the importance of having measures on the quality of a transplant. Akl et al. [2008] build 5-year graft survival predictions for living-donors with a Cox regression-based monogram and an artificial neural network model. Their motivation is to find the best prediction methodology since that would allow the choice of the best possible kidney donor and the optimum immunosuppressive therapy for a given patient. In Nemati et al. [2014] their statistical study shows that living-donor recipients have better graft survival rates in comparison with deceased-donation. Nevertheless, there is literature supporting the fact that predicting these rates for living-donation can significantly improve the hospitals allocation strategies, as even among living donors there can be significant differences. Krikov et al. [2007] develop a tree-based model to predict the probability of kidney graft survival at 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years, either with deceased and living donors. It is claimed that such predictions allow to identify the factors affecting the survival that may help in improving treatment strategies. Lasserre et al. [2012] estimate glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) of the recipient 1 year after the transplant. It is argued that since eGFR is an interpretable real-valued quantity, it might be more helpful than a binary success/failure prediction. Massie et al. [2016] develop an index to be used as a metric to compare multiple living donors. More recently, Luck et al. [2017] model a deep neural network to predict graft survibability given a specific donor and patient; however, their experiments focus on deceased donors.
It is well known that maximum weighted matchings can be computed in polynomial time (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz [1982] ). Let w p e for e ∈ E encode the information on graft quality associated with that matching for player p. At first glance, because on the kidney exchange game the objective functions of each player p (1) is replaced (generalized) by
it seems that the game would continue to be "easy to solve". However, when a measure of graft quality is considered, we prove that it becomes hard to compute a player best response and thus, to verify if a matching is an equilibrium.
Player p best response to a matching M −p corresponds to finding the internal matching M p of G p such that her total weight is maximized; the IA objective is analogous with weights w vu = w i vu + w j vu , for each edge (v, u) ∈ E I and v ∈ V i and u ∈ V j . For sake of simplicity, in our investigation of player p's best response, we assume that the IA continues to maximize the cardinality matching in E I requiring that a A is specified; note that this is always possible through a proper selection of the weights for the remaining players. We will simplify even further and assume that the A either behaves pessimistically, i.e., the IA selects the matching of maximum cardinality that minimizes player p's utility, or optimistically, i.e., the IA selects her matching of maximum cardinality that maximizes player p's utility. The pessimistic (respectively, optimistic) decision version, denoted by PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE (respectively, OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE), asks whether given a positive integer P , there is a matching M p ⊆ E p such that player p has a profit of at least P . The result of Theorem 3.1 might explain why some multi-agent kidney exchanges lead to so little transplantations as reported in Agarwal et al. [2019] : the players objective function is not the number of patients receiving a kidney. Moreover, in Carvalho et al. [2017] an example of a weighted kidney exchange game with no pure Nash equilibria is provided. These observations motivate the computational analysis of the next section, where we aim to understand the practical impact of these theoretically negative results, and thus, whether novel policies are required to address multi-agent interactions in an attempt to get a kidney exchange program that engages agents and positively impacts the social welfare. Additionally, we can conclude that computing any social optimum (i.e., to solve the problem as a single decision-maker one) should not result in an equilibrium. In a non equilibrium outcome, players do not have incentive to follow it ant to contribute with full information.
Computational evidence
In this section, we will compute pure Nash equilibria of the kidney exchange game when each player goal is to maximize the number of her patients receiving a kidney, objective function (1), and when the goal is to maximize the total weight associated with her patients receiving a kidney, objective function (3). To that end, we will generate graphs that mimic the realistic instances. The aim of this section is twofold: evaluate the rate of social welfare equilibria for the cardinality case and the rate of pure Nash equilibria for the weighted case.
In Section 4.1, we clarify how we build our generator of instances and the algorithmic details to verify if a matching is an equilibrium. In Section 4.2, we evaluate the rate of equilibria on the generated instances for the cardinality game, denoted by #-KEG, and for the weighted game, denoted by W-KEG.
Implementation details
Test instances
Typically, the kidney exchange literature carries the computational analysis on graphs generated according to Saidman et al. [2006] ; compatibility graphs are generated based on probabilities of blood type and of donor-patient tissue compatibility that were obtained through data from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in the United States. Ashlagi and Roth [2012] show that, in practice, kidney exchange pools can be much sparser than the pools generated by the Saidman simulator. For this reason, Glorie et al. [2014] introduced some modifications on this simulator. Constantino et al. [2013] produced KEP instances with low, medium and high density graphs; the low density graphs have on average a density similar to the ones by Saidman et al. [2006] . Since, there are no computational results on game theoretical approaches using the aforementioned instances, we generated instances based on data from the Canadian Kidney Paired Donation program (KPD), contributing with a new set of instances, as well as a generator 2 . Our set of players are the Canadian provinces.
Generator of the KPD: The Canadian Blood Services provided us data on the KPD which enabled us to build the instance generator described on Table 2 . The only input parameters of the generator are |V |, the total number of incompatible patient-donor pairs, and a year between 2009 and 2013. The prevalence of highly-sensitized patients, i.e., patients with low probability of being compatible with a random donor, is generated based on the report Canadian Blood Services [2014] for the years between 2009 and 2013. Determining the degree of sensitization is done through the calculated panel reactive antibody (cPRA). For instance, according to that report, in 2009 there were approximately 14% patients on the KPD with cPRA≥ 97%, while in 2013 it increased to 53%; thus, this input parameter controls the density of the instances.
Step 1 Assignment of pairs to provinces Given |V |, our generator determines the number of pairs from V belonging to each province according to their distribution in the KPD data; see the pie chart Figure 4 .
Step 2 Generation of players vertices/Generation of provinces' pairs Given a province and the number of pairs belonging to it (determined in the previous step), our generator assigns to each pair, the patient blood group and cPRA, and the donor blood group. This assignment is based on the patient-donor blood group distribution of that province, while the cPRA distribution is based on its national distribution in the KPD (due to the lack of data for each specific province). Patients are considered highly-sensitized when their cPRA is high (high probability of being crossmatch incompatible). In Canadian Blood Services [2014] , it is reported the distribution of the cPRAs equal to 0%, between 1-50%, 51-94%, 95-96% and 97-100% for each year between 2009 and 2013. This distribution changed along these 5 years, and it seems to start stabilizing. However, we decided to leave as a parameter of our generator the selection of the year determining the cPRA distribution; the reason for this is that on the first year of the report, 2009, there were 14% of the patients with cPRA above 97%, while in 2013, they become 53% of the patients in the pool; by having the year as a parameter for the cPRA distribution, we will be able to understand the impact of highly-sensitized patients in the game outcome. The higher the cPRA value of a patient, the less likely is she compatible with a random donor.
Step 3 Generation of edges/Generation of compatabilities among pairs In order to build the edges representing reciprocal compatibilities between pairs, blood compatibility is verified and, if satisfied, an edge is draw with probability equal to the multiplication of (1-cPRA) of the patients on that pairs (i.e., the probability of both patients being compatible with the donors). For each |V | ∈ {30, 40, 50} and year ∈ {2009, 2013}, we generated the following instances:
• ins ∈ {1, . . . , 10}: 10 instances with all players (ten provinces);
• ins ∈ {11, . . . , 20}: 10 instances with 3 players (Ontario, British Columbia & Yukon and Alberta); • ins ∈ {21, . . . , 30}: 10 instances with 3 players (Ontario, Quebec and Prince Edward Island).
Algorithmic approach
For each instance, we compute (1) the K best solutions (game outcomes) 3 and (2) verify for each of them if it is an equilibrium, and, if yes, how close it is from a social optimum.
For #-KEG it is very likely the existence of multiple social optima, i.e., multiple matchings of maximum cardinality and we know that there must be at least one that is an equilibrium. Thus, for these games, we will compute at most K = 1, 000 random social optimal solutions (matchings of maximum cardinality) in task (1). In order to uniformly generate 1, 000 matchings of maximum cardinality, we use the dynamic programming method described in Appendix E. On the other hand, for W-KEG, the mutiplicity of maximum weighted matchings is less likely, no SWE is guaranteed to exist and thus, we use the framework by Lawler [1972] to perform task (1) with K = 1, 000.
Let us now concentrate on task (2). Verifying if a matching M is a Nash equilibrium implies verifying that any player p's best response to M −p does not lead to an increase in the player's utility in comparison with M ∩ E p . Therefore, to execute task (2) we will compute each player's best response; in this context, we concentrate on the player's best responses in W-KEG, since it generalizes the best response computations under #-KEG (#-KEG is the special case of W-KEG with weights equal to 1). Unless P = N P , a very unlikely event, Theorem 3.1 implies that there is no polynomial time algorithm to compute a player best response and thus, to verify if a matching is an equilibrium. Nevertheless, we were able to build an exact algorithm for this purpose that in practice, i.e., for the instances created by our generator, runs in seconds. Furthermore, in order to compute best responses, A must be known. In this way, for each maximum (weighted) matching, if there is a A making that matching an equilibrium, then it will be that one used in the best response computation; note that this will bias the analyses in the direction of increasing the likelihood of having equilibria. See Appendix D for details on this implementation.
In this context, we highlight that it is out of the scope of this paper to explore time improvements for the computational implementations.
Our algorithmic implementations were in Python 3.7.1, except the algorithm of Appendix E which was coded in Julia 1.1.0; the latter was the most time consuming part of our experiments and thus, it benefited from the use of a compiled language; nevertheless, we enforced a time limit of 2 hours for it. In case the time limit is reached, the corresponding entry in the tables indicates "tl". All the optimization problems have been solved with IBM CPLEX 12.9.0. The experiments were conducted on an Intel Xeon E5-2637 processor clocked at 3.50GHz and equipped with 8 GB RAM, using a single core. In our result Tables 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, 8, |M | max denotes the number of edges of the maximum cardinality matching, #|M | max denotes the number of distinct matchings of size |M | max , % #-NE is the percentage of equilibria in the sample of 1, 000 matchings of maximum cardinality, IM P max denotes the maximum increase on utility obtained by a province (or set of provinces) in an equilibrium in comparison with the maximum utility when restricted its individual pool, P layers max denotes the set of provinces reaching that maximum increase, IM P min denotes the minimum increase on utility obtained by a province (or set of provinces) in an equilibrium in comparison with the maximum utility when restricted to its individual pool, P layers min denotes the set of provinces reaching that minimum increase, IA high and IA low are the maximum and minimum number of international transplants in a computed equilibrium, respectively, time gen is the time in seconds to uniformally generate 1, 000 matchings of maximum cardinality and time N E is the average time to verify if a sampled matching is an equilibrium.
Computational simulations
#-KEG
Tables 3, 4 correspond to #-KEG with all the 10 provinces as players. As expected the instances associated with 2009 have matchings of higher cardinality and significantly higher number of maximum matchings in comparison with 2013. Nevertheless, the density of the graphs does not seem to reflect any trend on the prevalence of SWE: for the instances with 30 vertices, 2013 has a very high percentage of equilibria, while for the instances of size 40, there is no different trend between 2009 and 2013 on the percentage of equilibria; for the instances of size 50 such comparison cannot be made, as the algorithms on 2009 instances exceeded the time limit to samples equilibria. Under an equilibrium, by definition, no player is worst than if she did not participated in the game, does the column IM P min is always non-negative. In fact, in our computational results it takes always the value 0; this means that there were SWE under which there was at least a player that did not improve her utility. For example, Prince Edward Island appears always in this column which can be explained by the fact that this is the smallest player and thus, less likely to contribute to the exchanges. In opposition, Ontario, the largest player, is the one that appears the less in the column P layers min . From a fairness point of view, empirically this indicates that on SWE the players that contribute the most to the game are compensated. Let us now concentrate on the column IM P max . In general, the maximum increases on utility are strictly positive. In column P layers max , except for instances with very few matchings of maximum cardinality (and thus, SWE), the smallest provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, never get the highest increase under a SWE. Again, this seems to enforce that SWE are the "fair" game outcome to concentrate as they benefit players according to their degree of participation. Finally, note that the average times in time N E show that this step can be done efficiently with our algorithm while the bottleneck is the sampling of matchings of maximum cardinality. The results of this tables support the importance of using the concept of equilibria both to reflect strategical behaviors and fairness on the Kidney Exchange outcome. Although, for the majority of instances the percentage of SWE computed was higher than %50 (recall that we are using A such that the likelihood of a matchings being an equilibrium is maximized), it is not guaranteed that simply using a maximum matching one will have an equilibrium. Table 3 . Results for the #-KEG with the Canadian KPD instances.
Tables 6, 7, correspond to #-KEG with 3 players: Ontario, British Columbia & Yukon and Alberta. The results in the tables indicate that when there are few matchings of maximum cardinality then the percentage of equilibria is very high, while in the reverse case the percentage of equilibria is small. Even for the cases of size 40 and 50, for year 2013, the prevalence of equilibria decreases. Therefore, we can expect that in real instances that typically have more than 100 pairs, there is a low number of equilibria, probably explained by the fact that players also have large sets of feasible strategies. Thus, algorithms targeted to directly and efficiently compute become crucial. In this 3-player setting, columns P layers max and P layers min , do not seem to present any trend, i.e., all three players seem to appear similar number of times in both of them, which might be explained by the fact that this is a more balanced setting, where players have similar contributions to the kidney exchange program. Among the results presented on this section, the number of players and their respective size does not seem to influence the percentage of equilibria.
year |V | 
W-KEG
W-KEG is not guaranteed to have a social welfare equilibrium, i.e., a Nash equilibrium that is a matching of maximum weight. Thus, we concentrate on determining -SWE: the lower value of such that a pure Nash equilibrium is at most away of the maximum weighted matching.
In the following results, the goal of the IA is to compute a maximum weighted international matching, as referred to in the beginning of this section. Due to the lack of data on donors' characteristics fundamental to compute quantities such as Risk Index for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation or to use machine learning models to predict graft survival, we generated the weights for this game according to the donors' age distribution on the Canadian Kidney Paired Donation Program; see Figure 5 . From the original data, we generated random ages with replacement (bootstrapping). Indeed, the literature on kidney transplantion has empirically demonstrated that donors' age is a significant predictor of graft survivability Terasaki et al. [1997] , Berger et al. [2011] . In order to generate weights, we sample uniformly with replacement from the data points x with donors' age; let x u be an element of our sampling, then the weights are generated as follows:
In this way, a younger donor has associated higher weights. Note that the formula above generates normalized weights, i.e., between 0 and 1.
Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 8, summarize our computational results concerning W-KEG. In these tables, we do not report the value of the maximum weighted matching since it is not easy to understand its meaning as in the cardinality case. Therefore, the tables provide relative results. For instance, K are the best K maximum weighted matchings (which will be at most 1, 000), % W-NE is the percentage of equilibria among the best K maximum weighted matchings, is the ratio between the first computed weighted matching that is an equilibrium (iter-th matching) and the maximum weighted matching; when an equilibrium is not found, the table reports the maximum value for ; note that close to 1 means that the first equilibirum computed is close to be a social optimum; iter is the iteration in which the first equilibrium is determined; P layers max and P layers min are defined as before; IM P max and IM P min are the maximum and minimum utility increases under equilibria divided by the total weight of the first equilibrium determined (so that this value is always smaller than 1); finally, IA high and IA low are the maximum and minimum fraction of international edges among the equilibria computed, respectively.
In Tables 9, 10, all 10 provinces participate in the game. Instances associated with year 2013 seem to be more likely to have a SWE, which can be explained by the fact that these correspond to sparse graphs where players have less alternative strategies to deviate to. In these results, there is a significant number of instances for which in the K best weighted matchings there was no equilibria; in fact, e.g., for instance |V | = 30, year 2009, ins = 2, there are no pure equilibria. Columns P layer max and P layer min seem to present the trend saw on the #-KEG results: the four smallest provinces typically appear in P layer min while the largest appear in P layer max . On the other hand, while in #-KEG there was usually more than one province achieving the maximum improvement, here, in general, there is a single province attaining the maximum advantage.
year |V | Table 9 . Results for the W-KEG with the Canadian KPD instances.
Tables 11 and 12 report our computational results concerning W-KEG with the three largest provinces. In a majority of instances, the percentage of equilibria is small, in particular for all instances of size |V | = 50. This might be explained by the fact that all players own a significant percentage of the pairs in the game and thus, they have more feasible strategies, which reflects to incentives for deviating from a k-th best weighted matching. It is interesting to note, that among all players, the largest one, Ontario, appears few times in the column P layers min meaning that these K best weighted matchings seem to fairly compensate the contribution of this player. Finally, observe that in most of the instances, IA establishes a significant benefit for international exchanges. Tables 13 and 14 report our computational results concerning W-KEG with a large, medium and a small player. Most of these instances have a -SWE with < 2, while with the results with ten players a -SWE failed to be found. Combining this with the fact that the first -SWE is generally determined before the K 2 -th best weighted matching, it can be argued that these -SWE can be reasonable solutions for the game as the social optimum is not significantly sacrificed. Prince Edward Island is almost always present in the column P layers min , while in the column P layers max Ontario appears more often than Quebec and Prince Edward Island almost does not appear. Once again, this seems to indicate that equilibria provide fair benefits to the participating players. Table 13 . Results for the W-KEG with the Canadian KPD instances with the largest player, a medium player and the smallest player: Ontario, Quebec and Prince Edward Island.
Conclusions and open questions
In this work, we reviewed the literature on cross-border Kidney Exchange Programs, and motivated the reason to concentrate on the non-cooperative game theoretical approach. Known results for the two-player case were generalized to an arbitrary finite number of players. In this context, for #-KEG (1) it was discussed the mechanism that incentives players to fully disclose their compatibility graphs and (2) it was established the existence of social welfare equilibria which can be computed in polynomial time, stressing the feasibility of such solution being computed and used in practice. Furthermore, it was anticipated how the game outcome would change upon the availability of information on transplants quality. Namely, we proved that the verification of Nash equilibrium for the W-KEG becomes an NPcomplete problem, which is an indication that such solution might not be practical. Nevertheless, our computational results have shown that, in practice, this is a tractable problem (recall Section 4, in particular, columns time N E on the computational results tables). Finally, on our computational results, we tested the concept of Nash equilibria on instances closely inspired by the topology of the Canadian Kidney Pair Donation Program. These results demonstrated that for the #-KEG, random selection of a social optimal solution might not result in an equilibrium, revealing the need to use this concept. Interestingly, the computed social welfare equilibria provide a good balance in terms of advantage to the participating players. In what concerns W-KEG, computational results show that SWE might fail to exist and even (pure) equilibria might not exist. Nevertheless, a majority of instances had equilibria, which did not seem to be far from social optimal solutions.
The analysis of this game theoretical model opens interesting research directions. The #-KEG enjoys excellent properties from the players and social welfare point of view and thus, its seems a promising model to extend the study, namely, to exchanges of size larger than 2 and to include chains. However, once exchanges of size 3 are allowed, SWE might not exist (see the example in Figure 6 ) and if there are 3 players, the game might not have a pure equilibrium (see Figure 7 ). A possible way to overcome these issues can be to restrict the IA to exchanges of size 2 or consider that the game is played over time, so as cooperation might be achieved because players can punish any disobedient on future plays. Still on the extensions to exchanges of larger size, an interesting study would be about the characterization of correlated equilibria. Correlated equilibrium is a more broader concept than Nash equilibrium, and thus, their relation with social optima would be of interest to evaluate. Our computational results on #-KEG show that KEPs can easily have multiple optimal solutions and thus, for sake of fairness and proper evaluation of KEPs outcomes, it is crucial to develop tools that enable the generation of random optimal solutions. This work also studied for the first time W-KEG. Under this setting, although examples can be found where equilibria do not exist, the computational results reveal that, in practice, the social optimum might not be too sacrificed in order to get an equilibrium. Ideally, one would prefer to have theoretical guarantees. Some criticism might be pointed out to this game model: players might manipulate the information provided in order to associate high weights to exchanges that would benefit their patients and/or players use different technologies to evaluate pairs health. Thus, fundamental future research is in the development of a mechanism available for the players to associate weights that minimize players manipulation or differences among players' evaluation of the pairs. An interesting alternative could be to allow players to provide a list of preferences to their potential transplants; in this way, two games would be played: countries play #-KEG (game 1) while guaranteeing that their pairs are under a stable matching (game 2), i.e., no two pairs would be better off (higher in their preference list) by leaving their current match and establishing a matching among them. The ideas is that players seek an equilibrium to #-KEG which is also a stable matching. Finally, since it has been argued that in living donations the primary goal is to maximize the number of transplants, one could consider a game where players follow a hierarchycal optimization, where first they aim to maximize the number of their patients receiving a transplant and second, among all solutions that lead to the same number of their patients matched, they maximize matchings' weights.
In conclusion, there are many important points both on modeling cross boarder Kidney Exchange Programs and on their analysis that need to be addressed and, in this paper, we provided a consistence base to support further research. Figure 6 : A game instance with l = 3. The social optimum (in blue) is 6 but the only equilibrium is for the gray player to select her internal cycle of length 3. ; Player diamond has two possible strategies ∅ and (3, 10, 2). The IA selects cycle (1,6,2) and (4,3,10) when no internal exchange is selected.
A Proof of Theorem 2.1
For sake of clarity and in order to make the paper self contained, we recall some known results on matching theory and kidney exchange games.
Algorithm A.0.1 recalls the high level computation of a maximum matching. Edmonds [1965] proved that step 2 can run in polynomial time which implies that the full algorithm also runs in polynomial time. end if 6: end for 7: return M Next, we recover from Carvalho et al. [2017] the theorem providing the necessary and sufficient condition under which a player has incentive to deviate from a maximum matching. For an illustration of their result see Figures 8 and 9 .
Theorem A.1. Let M be a maximum matching. A player p ∈ N has incentive to deviate from M ∩ E p if and only if 1. there is a M p ∪ M ∩ E I -alternating path p in G p = (V, E p ∪E I ) whose origin is a node in V p , unmatched in this path, and the destination is a M ∩ E I p -matched node in V −p and Figure 9 : Player 1 owns the white circles, player 2 owns the gray diamonds and player 3 owns the magenta squares. Suppose algorithm A takes decisions accordingly with the figures above. If p = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) , player 1 does not have incentive to deviate from M ∩ E 1 = {(5, 4)} to (M ⊕ p) ∩ E 1 = ∅ because algorithm A does not output matchings (5, 6) and (7, 8), but (6, 7) and (8, 9) which is also maximum (external) matching.
A
The results above will enable us to prove Theorem 2.1. To that end we introduce the definition of maximal Maugmenting path in G D = (V ∪ D, E ∪ E D ) which is a M -alternating path starting in a M -unmatched vertex of V , ending in a edge of E D which cannot be removed and replaced by other edges without the path stopping to be M -augmenting. Now, we have all elements to build the overall algorithm that we denote as Algorithm A.0.2.
Algorithm A.0.2 Computation of a SWE given a maximum matching M . The correctness of Algorithm A.0.2 is proven by the following theorem. Proof. By construction,M is a maximum matching of G:M starts by being a maximum matching of G, step 4, and afterwards, maximalM -alternating paths in G D are applied toM which does not change the cardinality ofM in G (but augments the number of vertices matched in G D ). Therefore, the outputM is a social optimum. It remains to show thatM is a Nash equilibrium. To that end, one must prove that there is noM -alternating path as in Theorem A.1.
Let us define P as the set of disjoint paths obtained throughM ⊕ M ;M and M are maximum matchings of G, thus the operation ⊕ leads to cycles of even size and paths. Note thatM = M ⊕ p∈P p. By construction, any path in P is a maximal M -augmenting path in G D.
By contradiction, suppose that p = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) is aM -alternating path in G as in Theorem A.1. If p is a maximal M -augmenting path in G D , then it should have been found in step 5 (or was contained in a maximal M -augmenting path in G D ). Thus, p is not maximal M -augmenting path, i.e., it is not in P. This implies that v 1 isM -matched with a d u,v1 ∈ D. Letp ∈ P be the path containing the edge (d v1,u , v 1 ), thenp is not a maximal M -augmenting path in G D , since it could have been extended through p (ending in (d v k ,r , r)).
Algorithm A.0.2 can run in polynomial time since its most consuming time operation, step 5, can be done in polynomial time; recall Algorithm A.0.1.
Finally, we relax the previous theorem dependence in the output of A.
whereM is a maximum matching, and give it as input for Algorithm A.0.2. Now, proceed as in the previous proof to compute P, but without edges in E D . Each p ∈ P can be partitioned in p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k such that p = p 1 p 2 . . . p k and each p i ∈ E p ∪ E I . For each p, while A agrees with the application of p i to M through operation ⊕ ( i.e.,
In the end, by the same arguments as the previous proof, the obtained M is an equilibrium.
B Proof of Theorem 2.3
Without loss of generality, assume that the players' set of revealed vertices satisfy |V 1 | ≥ |V 2 | ≥ . . . ≥ |V n |.
The optimal solution of the following maximum weighted matching is a maximum matching and prioritizes the players with more vertices revealed:
where w u,v is equal to (|V 1 | + |V 2 |)|V | + |V i | + |V j | for u ∈ V i and v ∈ V j . Note that Problem (4) is a maximum weighted matching and thus, it can be solved in polynomial time.
Next, we split the proof in two parts by proving the following claims.
Claim B.1. The optimal solution of Problem (4) is a maximum cardinality matching A maximum cartinality matching M has weight at least |M | (|V 1 | + |V 2 |)|V | + |V n−1 | + |V n | . Suppose that a maximum weighted matchingM is not of maximum cardinality. Then, it has weight at most
which contradicts the fact thatM is a maximum weighted matching.
Claim B.2. The optimal solution of Problem (4) prioritizes the players with more revealed vertices.
Suppose that there is a M solution for Problem (4) and aM with |M | = |M |, such that
Therefore, it holds e∈M ∩p w e < e∈M ∩p w e which implies that M is not the optimum of Problem (4).
C Proof of Theorem 3.1
Next, we show that PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete even when player p's internal graph is bipartite. To that end, we reduce in polynomial time the following NP-complete problem to PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE:
Problem: FEEDBACK VERTEX SET Instance: A diagraph G = (V, A) and a positive integer l.
Question: Does there exist a set V ⊆ V such that |V | ≤ l and G = (V \ V , A) has no directed cycle?
Proof. We split the proof in two parts by proving the following claims.
Given M p , the pessimistic IA problem can be solved in polynomial time. Compute (in polynomial time) a maximum cardinality matching for IA given M p . Let k be the size of such matching. Then, the IA problem reduces to find a minimum weighted matching for player p of cardinality k which is equivalent to the well-known k-cardinality assigment problem. A k-cardinality assigment problem can be solved in polynomial time Dell'Amico and Martello [1997] , Dell'Amico et al. [2001] .
First, we reduce in polynomial time, an instance of FEEDBACK VERTEX SET to one of PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE:
• Let N = {A, B} with p = A.
• Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. Set V A = V ∪ L with L = {1, 2, . . . , l} and V B = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }.
• Set E A = {(i, j) : i ∈ L, j ∈ V } and w A e = 2 for e ∈ E A . Note that G A is bipartite. See Figure 10 .
∈ A}, and w A e = n for e ∈ Id and w A e = 1 for e ∈ A. See Figure 11 . • Set P = 2l + n(n − l).
We claim that in the constructed instance of PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE, player A can have a profit of 2l+n(n−l) if and only if the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET instance has answer YES.
Proof of if. Assume the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET instance has answer YES. Then, there is a V ⊆ V with |V | ≤ l such that G = (V \ V , A) does not contain any directed cycle. Set M A = {(i, v i ) : v i ∈ V }, leading to an internal profit of 2|V |. Now, the vertices v i ∈ V are M A -matched and thus are not available for the IA. In this way, the maximum cardinality matching for the IA is n − |V | (number of player A's vertices available for the IA), which can be attained by matching (v i , v i ) for v i ∈ V \V . However, the IA has incentive to avoid to select edges in Id since they have associated a weight of n for player A. If there is an IA matching of maximum cardinality n − |V | that contains an edge (v i , v j ) ∈ A, then there is a cycle in the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET instance: v j must be matched with v j1 , j 1 = j, v j1 must be matched with v j2 , j 1 = j 2 , . . . , v j k is matched with v i (note that there is a finite number of vertices); then,
Proof of only if. Now assume that the PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is a YES instance. Then, there is M A ⊆ E A such that player A's profit is equal or greater to 2l + n(n − 1). Let V be equal to the set of M A -matched vertices in V . Note that |V | ≤ l, since G A is bipartite with the vertices partition L with size l. If the IA matching M I for M A is not contained in Id, as show in the proof of if, there is a cycle in G of size at least 2. Recall that the IA behaves pessimistically for player A and thus, she has incentive to select matchings associated with cycles in G . Therefore, player A has incentive to match internally l vertices which means |V | = l. In this way, player A's profit is equal or less than 2l + 2 + n(n − 2 − l) which contradicts the fact that player A's profit was equal or greater than 2l + n(n − l). Next, we show that OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete. To that end, we reduce in polynomial time the following NP-complete problem to OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE:
Problem: 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING Instance: Given sets X, Y , Z, each of size n, and a set T ⊂ X × Y × Z.
Question: Is there a set of n triples in T such that each element is contained in exactly one triplet?
(3-DIM)
Lemma C.4. OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete.
Proof. We split the proof in two parts by proving the following claims. Claim C.5. OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is in NP.
Given M p , we can solve the optimistic IA problem in polynomial time by reducing it to a maximum weighted matching problem using a standard trick: replace the weights w p e for e ∈ E I p by w p e +|V −p |w max and the remaining e ∈ E I \E I p by w min − + |V −p |w max , where w max = max e∈E I p w p e w min = min e∈E I p w p e and w min − > 0; with these new weights, the corresponding maximum weighted matchingM is always a matching of maximum cardinality plus it is the one that benefits the most player p. < |M |w max |V −p | but M has a higher weight, which contradicts the fact thatM is a maximum weighted matching for the international graph.
-M is the optimistic matching for player p. Otherwise, suppose that there is a maximum cardinality matching M of the international graph that leads to a higher weighted matching for player p. Since both M andM have maximum cardinality, then |M ∩ E I −p | < |M ∩ E I −p | and |M ∩ E I p | > |M ∩ E I p |. However, any edge in E I −p has weight w min − + |V −p | which is strictly smaller than the weight of any edge in E I p (which is w e + |V −p |), implying thatM would not have been optimal.
Claim C.6. OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-hard.
First, we reduce in polynomial time, an instance of 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING to one of OPTIMISTIC BEST RE-SPONSE:
• Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t |T | }. Make V A = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ T ∪ T x ∪ T y ∪ T z , where T (·) = {t (·) 1 , t (·) 2 , . . . , t
|T | } (that is, we make 3 copies of each t ∈ T ). Make V B = T ∪ T , where T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t |T | } (that is, a copy of T ).
• Set E A = {(x i , t x l ), (y j , t y l ), (z k , t z l ) : t l = (x i , y j , z k ) ∈ T } and E I = {(t x , t), (t y , t), (t z , t), (t, t), (t, t ) : t ∈ T }. All edges have weight 1, except nodes (t, t) ∈ E I that have weight 2|T |. See Figure 12 .
• Set P = 3n + 2n|T | + 2(|T | − n).
x i y j z k 1 1 1 2|T | 1 Figure 12 : Gadget t = (x i , y j , z k ) ∈ T . Gray vertices belong to player A and white vertices belong to player B.
We claim that in the constructed instance of OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE, player A can have a profit of at least P = 3n + 2n|T | + 2(|T | − n) if and only if the 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING instance has answer YES.
Proof of if. Assume the 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING instance has answer YES. Then, there is a 3-dimensional matching M ⊂ T of size n. Select the internal matching M A = {(x i , t x l ), (y j , t y l ), (z k , t z l ) : t l ∈ M }. Note that M A is a matching since w.l.o.g. if (x i , t x l ), (x i , t x r ) ∈ M A , then t l and t r are in M , meaning that M was not a valid 3-dimensional matching. This gives an internal profit for player A equal to 3n . For all gadgets t, the optimistic IA selects the edge (t, t) ∈ E I leading to a total weight of 2n|T |. Finally, for all the gadgets t / ∈ M , the IA has to select a matching of cardinality 2 which can be (t x , t), (t, t ), leading to a total weight of 2(|T | − n). In this way, player A's profit is equal to 3n + 2n|T | + 2(|T | − n) = P.
Proof of only if. Now, assume that the OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is a YES instance. Then, there is M A such that player A's profit is greater or equal to P = 3n + 2n|T | + 2(|T | − n). If this internal matching does not match t x , t y and t z for any gadget t, the optimistic IA has always a matching of size two available in each gadget, leading to a profit of at most 4|T | that is less than P . In this way, player A must match internally as many as possible of the vertices t x , t y and t z for each gadget t so that the IA does not have available the external matching of size 2 and it is forced to choose (t, t) with weight 2|T |. Whenever this is done, player A adds 3 + 2|T | to her profit. If only k < n gadgets have all t x , t y and t z matched internally, the utility is at most 3k + 2k|T | + 4(|T | − k). If k = n − 1, we have utility equal to 3(n − 1) + 2(n − 1)|T | + 4(|T | − n + 1) = 3n + 2n|T | + 2(|T | − n) + <0 1 − n, which is smaller than P .
D Verifying Equilibria
Algorithm D.0.1 enables to verify if there is an algorithm A such that a player p has no incentive to deviate from a matching M : player p utility under M is a lower bound LB for her best response to M −p ; player p's opponents strategies are fixed to M −p ; player p optimal solution when she controls the IA output and does not repeat previous evaluated solutions is determined leading to an upper bound U B; if the U B is less or equal to LB the player p has no incentive to deviate and the algorithm returns T rue; otherwise, the IA decision for new player p strategy is determined and it is evaluated if it improves player p solutions (i.e., if it is greater than LB); if yes, the algorithm returns F alse, otherwise, it computes a new strategy for player p.
Algorithm D.0.2 computes the IA solution that minimizes the benefits for player p.
E Uniform generation of maximum matchings
In Dyer [2003] a dynamic programming method for counting the number of optimal solutions for a multiple-knapsack is presented; furthermore, such computation is then used to uniformly generate optimal solutions. We adapt this paper idea to our matching polytope e∈E:i∈e
where OP T is the size of a maximum cardinality matching.
Our strategy for the uniform generation of maximum matchings will be based on counting them as we describe next.
Let F (K, r, s) for a graph G = (V, E) be the number of matchings with cardinality K when the subset of edges {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e r } ⊆ E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m } and the subset of vertices {v ∈ V : s v = 1} are available (s is a binary vector of size |V | that represents the vertices available). We aim to determine F (OP T, m, s ) when s = [1, 1, . . . , 1], i.e., the number of matchings with maximum cardinality. This can be done through the dynamic programming recursion
K < 0 ∨ r < 0 ∨ min(s) < 0 (the entries of F must be non negative) 0, K > r (there is no matching) 1, K = 0 ∧ r ≥ 0 ∧ min(s) ≥ 0 (there is one matching: ∅) 0, K > 0 ∧ r = 0 ∧ min(s) ≥ 0 (there is no matching) F (K, r − 1, s)+ F (K − 1, r − 1,ŝ) K > 0 ∧ r > 0 ∧ min(s) ≥ 0 (number of matchings not using er plus number of matchings using er ) whereŝ i = s i , except for i ∈ e r whereŝ i = s i − 1, i.e., if edge e r is part of a matching then the incident vertices become matched and thus, unavailable for the subsequent recursions. The computational time of this approach is O(|E| 2 2 |V | ).
The F (·) table can be used to determine a uniform point in (8) 
